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F~R RELEASE ~N DELIVERY SUNDAY 
J~DRESS BY SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., M0NTANA) 
AT THE 
LAW CENTER COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES 
GE0RGETOWN UNIVERSITY 
WASHINGT N, D. C. 
SUNDAY, MAY 25, 1975 
5:00 P. M., E. S. T. 
AFTER VIET NAM: A TIME FOR REASSESSMENT 
The cl~ss of 1975 is the first to gr~duate after the 
u. s. disengagP-ment frnm Indochina. This commencement alan 
marks the beginning of the fourth decade since World War II. 
Some here, t~day, among the graduates were active participants 
in the recent war. Among the parents, many played a part in 
World War II. It ie something of ~ confP-esion of my age to 
note that I was involved in World War I. I hasten to add, 
however, that it was at the very end nf that conflict. Further-
morP, I WA.S An urldPr-f!tg"d seaman tn the N.g,vy at the time. 
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My remarks will be directed to what we have in common 
as different generations of Americans. Whatever we may not 
have, we have the United States in common and at a most diffi-
cult moment in the nation's history. Clearly, we are not 
passing through the aest of times. Clearly, this is not 
freedom's finest hour. 
Do not look to me, however, to condemn an older 
generation for the present state of affairs. Nor will I blame 
the nation's plight on the young. Young people did not make 
the situation in which, together, we find ourselves; they have 
not yet had that opportunity. As for older generations, it is 
or to correct a few of the accumulated mistakes which they 
inherited when they were younger. 
So, I will not lead this commencement in a search for 
scapegoats. Let me try, instead, to set forth where I think 
we are, how we have arrived at this point, and where we ~ay 
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hope to go from here, nota.• ly in our relations with the reRt 
of the world . 
These questions cannot ~ e considered except in the 
ontext of the experienc~ in Indochina . Viet Nam is a ~ook 
that is now clos~d and, may I add , it is my fer vent hope that 
i t stay clos~d . I t has ~ een , this long and tragic war , a road-
hlock to the nation's future . It has been a funnel into which 
has diR~ppeRred a massive chunk of the nation ' s ideals , energies 
and exp~ctations . 
Although the book is closed on Viet Nam, it is essen-
tial thRt we not forget its costs . They were many and great . 
Some readil y Rpparent and some o~scure . For these remarks, 
today, it is hufficient to note only that fifty- five thousand 
Americans died in the WRr and I hope the l ast group, in the 
MRyRgUPZ affair . These young men were cut out of l ife Rt an 
ge not much differPnt from that of thi s graduat i ng class . 
•rt~e w('n.u.dPd 1 n Jr .. dn~"' ld n.c:t w~rc t l .. r~P. 1 undred t houRa.nd . One 
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hundred fifty billion dollars or more in public funds were 
spent to pursue the war. Before the final reckoning (all the 
•ills will not be paid until well into the next century)~ the 
cost undoubtedly will have doubled and doubled again. 
In this nation~ a large segment of our strength and 
resources was diverted to support the misbegotten venture. 
As a result, much of what needed doing at home by government 
was not done or not done very well, In the name of security 
against vague threats from Southeast Asia~ the inner security 
of the nation was neglected for almost a decade, 
The war left thP- nation's economy in worse straits 
than at any time since the Great Depression, We are paying 
its price in the present inflation-depression. There are 
sputteringa now and then hut ther~ are as yet no real signs 
of recovery. On the contrary, over eight million people remain 
unemployed, with the impact of this figure felt especially 
among ymmg Am~rlcsus a.nd :ln the great metropolitan centers. 
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energy. Yet few, if any, answers are being found to the 
questions. So far there is little to show in the way of 
results. 
Our present economic problems are duplicated abroad 
in many of the countries with whom, since the end of World 
War II, we have had the · ~losest connections, in particular, 
Western Europe and Japan. They have been military allies and 
we are associated with them in a variety of mutually advan-
tageous economic arrangements. The plight of some of these 
countries, Italy and the United Kingdom, for example, is grave. 
Problems of the kind I have mentioned have long cried 
out for concentrated public attention. They plead for an in-
jection of young energy and approaches, fresh intellectual 
resources and a new dedication in all aspects of the leader-
ship of this nation. That it has not been forthcoming, in my 
judgment, is due in no small part to the div~rsions a•road and, 
notably, to Southeast Asia 1~the past decade. 
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Whatever may have led us into the conflict in that 
region, it is now clear that the involvement hit us where it 
hurt most--in the nation's inner unity. The war opened with 
a Presidential call for support of the Commander- in- Chief; it 
was met by a patriotic affirmation of national unity . Before 
th~ war was over, however , we went through deeper divisions 
than any since the Civil War . We know now what we did not 
know at the out .. ~et . The involvement did not serve th~ inter-
ests of th s na '-ion or th-3 Viet"lf.mer· ~, Cu.r11bodian and Laotian 
people . That is the bittf' r r8 :::lity of th.i.G frustrating exper-
ience . 
We pursued a well- intentioned but impossihle dream. 
In its pursuit, the lands and penplea of Indochina were torn 
and hattered almost heyond recognition . While young Americans 
died in the tens of thousands , Vietnamese , Cambodians ~d 
LaotirulA-- mPn, women and children-- died in the millions . Three 
simple r JC' ~ cu lt,n·PA--V Jet Nam, r.~mbod i a aud La0s- -were over-
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whelmed hy the technology of modern warfare. Millions fled 
the villages, the hill-towns and the paddy fields.to escape 
the bombs and crossfire. They huddled as refugees in the 
cities, there to live in one way or another--including the 
widespread trafficking in drugs--off the troops. The swollen 
urban populations were fed, in major part, by imported food 
paid for by u. s. aid programs. Ironically, rice had to le 
sent from this nation to what is one of the richest rice sur-
plus areas of the world. While we \'Jere exporting food to 
Indochina, shortages at home pushed prices, sky-high, to 
Americans. 
Why? To what end? 
Now that recollections of the war are f~et receding 
into history, it is important to ask ourselves these questions. 
We must ask ourselves what impelled us into this ill-fated 
enterpris~? I raise the matter, not to open old wounos. Nor 
do I raise it to put the finger of blame on particular indivi-
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duals . There is blame enough to spare for all concPr nen--for 
a succession of Presidents , a succession of Congresses , a 
continuum of military and civilian bureaucrats . In the Pnd , 
there is hl~e enough for all of us . 
I raise ther questions because they must he ruised . 
Answers must he sought to them if the events of the past few 
WPeks in Indochina are to he not merely a depressing end to a 
long and bleak chapter in this nation ' s hiRtory hut also a new 
and hop~ful heg~r~ing . 
We have , in short) an obligation to clar ify what we 
wer~ about in Viet Nam for so many years . Th~t is a way of 
keeping faith with the Americans whom we sent to Indochina and 
who have not come back. That is an obligation which is owed 
to living generations and to the future citizens of this nation . 
Unless the questions are resolved in all honesty, we will have 
le~=trned nothillg Rn.d this nation 1 A historjc purpose will have 
emergpd under the pPrrruu.ent cloud of the war . On th~ other 
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hand, if an understanding of the tragic experience assures 
that this is, indeed, the last Viet Nam, then the sacrifices 
which have been exacted will be not without meaning. 
It is pointless, may I reiterate, to put the finger 
of responsibility on one President or another, on one party 
or the other, on the Defense Department the State Department 
or some other. We are all involved. There is no evading a 
national responsibility. 
Viet Nam did not spring suddenly out of partisan 
politics. Nor did it begin just a few years ago, in 1969, 
1966, 1964 or even 1961. In my judgment, the present involve-
ment is a culmination of a foreign policy which was born before 
most of the members of this graduating class. 
Parents here, today, will remember a great war and 
its aftermath over a quarter of a century ago. They will 
remember a military power assembled by a united people, de-
ployed all over the globe and welcomed by the oppressed every-
where in the world. It was an immense power which overwhelmed 
a tyranny in Europe and another in Asia. 
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After an atomic-sealed victory over Japan, this nation 
moved into the post-World War II era, intact, powerful and 
dynamic. In contrast, vast areas of the world lay in ruins 
around us, hungry, exhausted and bankrupt. The international 
leadership of the United States was sought in these circum-
stances hy friend and enemy even as it came to be opposed by 
the Soviet Union . As we saw it, then, this nation's economic 
dynamism was the only hope for what began to be called the 
"free world." As we saw it, too, this nation's military 
supremacy, including an atomic monopoly, was the principal 
bulwark against the aggressive spread of what was soon termed 
"monolithic Communism. " The term was applied to our erstwhile 
ally, the Soviet Union, and all nations and political movements 
which fell within what was believed to be the permanent orbit 
of -1oscow. 
TherP hegan an era of foreign policy based on those 
prF>miSE'R. TenR of billions 0f dollars of materials, s~rvices 
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and credits poured out of the United States into other countries, 
often to help them to recover and maintain free systems, more 
often, to keep them from "going communist." Aid went to Western 
Europe, to Asia, to Latin America and eventually, to Africa. 
In the name of the United Nations, a war was fought 
and financed by this country to hold back communism in Korea. 
We led the United Nations into a boycott of the revolutionary 
Chinese People's Republic which was held at the time to he in 
Moscow's orbit. Tens of thousands of man-hours of the expen-
sive time of U. s. government diplomats, agents and employees 
were invested in the effort to exclude the Peking government 
from the world community, if not to bring it down altogether. 
Multiple alliances were built which wove us into a common NATO 
defense of Western Europe and linked us in some sort of defense 
arrangements with forty nations or more around the globe. 
Hundreds of thousands of Americans in uniform went abroad, 
into military garrisons and bases in Europe and Japan and 
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elsewhere. Tens of billions of dollars worth 0f construction, 
equipment and weapons and nuclear warheads went with them . 
These policies were devised largely in the name of 
national security and world peace . They were called, accurately, 
bipartisan and were described less accurately as a mutual 
security program. The fact is that the policies, as late as 
the Innochina involvement, were largely a one-sided effort of 
the United States . They rested on the readiness of this 
nation to carry the preponderant burdens of cost and, in the 
last analysis, notably as in the case of Korea, the Dominican 
Republic and Indochina, the weight of direct U. S . military 
operations . 
For years, there was little reason to question these 
policies . CongrP.ss was predisposed by the experience of World 
War II to accept the leadership of the President . We were in 
a period of Go-called cold war with Soviet and Chinese communism. 
By the same token, alJie~ nations had no choice but to accept 
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the leadership of the United States which alone had the 
capacity to sustain this postwar system. 
To be sure, there were flaws in the structure even 
though they were not readily visible in the exhuberance of the 
times. In the first place, the security system relied so 
heavily on military power to maintain peace and, particularly, 
on u. s. military power that an undue burden of responsibility 
was consigned to the Armed Services even as an excessive drain 
was attached to the national economy. A zeal for a new-found 
internationalism, moreover, led us to label virtually every-
thing that we did abroad with that word and led us beyond 
essential national needs and humanitarian considerations, into 
an incautious involvement in almost every area of the world 
either in the name of "fighting Communism" or "promoting 
progress" or "insuring the nation's security." This worldwide 
projection of U. S. influence involved heavy expenditures of 
the people's money for all kinds of aid-programs and the crea-
tion of elaborate U. S. official establishments abroad. 
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r-t0reover, it prompted us to take on, as allies, a numher of 
governments who were dependents in all but name and with 
highly dubious roots of acceptance among their own people. 
The great vitality of the postwar economy of this nation also 
creatPd an erroneous belief in its inexhaustibility. Even as 
late as the onset of the Viet Namese War, we proceeded as though 
the nation could hav~ not only guns and butter but would also 
be able to pay for fat and ~rimmings. 
We pursued these policies, flaws and all, with little 
change for many years. We pursued them, however, in a world 
which was changing greatly. The nation's atomic monopoly came 
to an end. The myth of "monolithic Communism" disappeared in 
num rous political shifts among the Eastern Europeans and in 
the vast upheaval in the Chinese- Soviet relationship. Newly 
independent stRtes appeared in the underdeveloped areas, as 
classic colonialism was reduced to an historic r~lic. Europe 
recovered Alld wPnt far beyond recovery to new heights of 
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well-being. New economic dynamisms emerged, notably in Germany 
and Japan, even as our own economy showed signs of overwork. 
It was in these changed circumstances that we became 
involved in Indochina. We became involved for what had long 
been accepted as highly worthwhile ends. We became involved 
in the name of resisting "aggressive Communism," in the name 
of "national security, 11 in the name of 11 safeguarding inter-
national peace,'' and in the name of "honoring commitments" to 
what were weak and dependent governments. 
We went into Viet Nam, in short, on the wheels of the 
same policy and for many of the same reasons that we had gone 
into Korea a decade and a half earlier, only this time without 
even the modicum of international sanction which had, in the 
Korean situation, been supplied by the United Nations . We did 
so almost as an habituated response, with far less understanding 
of the actual situation ln JndoC'hina and unmindful of the changes 
which l1ad taken place in this nation, in Asia and in the world. 
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I think it is now widely understood that Viet Nam 
w~s a mistake, a tragic mistake . 
To have persisted in it in the closing days of the 
sudden collapse of the synthetic military government which 
existed in Saigon at the time would have been to do violence 
to the welfare of the nation and to add to the sur feit of 
violence which had already been visited on the Indochinese 
peninsula . In my judgment , the determination of Congress to 
face up to and to act on that reality by refusing to supply 
a further billion dollars in military aid was a singular service 
to this nation and to the people of Indochina . We had armed, 
trained , financed and fought for dubious governments in Viet Nam 
and Cambodia . We had done our share-- far more than our share--
to inject them with the elements of survival . What last ditch 
effort would have been likely to do anything more? 
In writing an end to the involvement in Indochina, I 
believe Congress also underscored the beginning of a new era 
ju thP. nRt.inn' s int.Prwtt:lmnl r 1A.tions . MistA.kes have been 
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made during the past thirty years in the conduct of these 
relations and, certainly, Indochina was the last and greatest. 
Do not think for a moment, however, that the experience of 
these three decades was all a mistake. Much that was done 
had to be done, in the enduring interests of this nation and 
the world. Much that is being done now needs still to be done. 
A vast web of trade and cultural relationships, for 
example, has been woven with the rest of the world. It has 
served for many years to enhance the lives of hundreds of 
millions of people. By the same token, a sudden sundering of 
this web could bring upheavals and conflicts of a most disas-
trous kind. We have also begun to perceive in these twenty-
five years, I believe, the dimensions of the problem of main-
taining permanent peace. That perception may make us more aware 
of our essential national limitations as well as our vast 
national potential. In the process, we may gain greater aware-
ness of the significance of human interdependency and mutual 
concern if the world is ever to know stability. Peace cannot be 
maintai ned by Uni ted States power alone. 
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It would compound the tragedy if, in the bitter after-
math of Indochina, we were to turn our backs on this advance. 
It would be a step backward if we were to veer from what hecame 
an excessive, one might say, an obsessive international involve-
ment to an extreme of disinvolvement. 
That danger has been intensified, it seems to me, not only in 
the post-Indochina atmosphere of disillusionment but becRuse 
we are in the midst of a serious economic situation at home. 
I hope it will be recognized, therefore, that it is 
possible to withdraw from Indochina without seceding from the 
world. If we make that distinction--and I am confident that 
the people of this nation and their representatives in Congress 
will make it--than it should be possible to withdraw militarily 
not only from Indochina but from the entire Southeast Asian 
mainland, including Thailand, withnut severing normal inter-
nation~l contact with that region and certainly withnut 
aPandnning our vital interests in what transpires on the 
periphery of the Asian mainland. 
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Similarly, we should be able, in time, to reduce 
sharply and re-order the United Stated deployment of over 
half a million armed forces and dependents in Western Europe 
three decades after World War II without forsaking the essential 
mutual pledges of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. I have 
supported and urged such reductions for a decade. The events 
in Indochina in no way alter my view that one or two divisions 
of U. s. forces stationed in Europe commits the United States 
no less irrevocably than five. Timing of reductions is another 
matter but I can only say that the sooner they begin, the more 
gradual and less dislocative will they be. 
We must, too, in the Congress exercise a firm and 
discriminating control over the enormous expenditures which are 
made in the name of national defense and, at the same time, 
still provide adequately for the security of the nation. We 
should find it feasib~to curb the carelessness, costliness 
and cosiness which has filtered into the Armed Forces system, 
notably in contracting with defense industries, without 
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demeaning and discouraging the millions of dedicated men and 
women who wear the uniform. \ole should be capable of shutting 
down obsolescent and over - extended aid programs without losing 
a human compassion for the other people with whom we share the 
earth. 
If these adjustments are to be made effectively, it 
seems to me that they must be accompanied by new and vigorous 
efforts of American diplomacy . These efforts should be aimed 
at securing agreements among nations which would make inter-
national stability more dependent on mutual undertakings and 
less on the unilateral commitment of the military power of 
this or any other nation . Such agreements in the Far Pacific, 
for example, would have to involve not only the United States 
and Japan, but also the People 1 s Republic of China, the Soviet 
Union, the Philippines and other nations . Communist or not, 
there is a sufficient pool of common interests in preserving 
peace and developing tradP among these Asian and Pacific nations 
to make the search for new understandings more thA.n a quixotic 
venture . 
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May I say that I find it most helpful in this respect 
that President Nixon initiated official contact with the Chinese 
People's Republic and that the bi-lateral ties of Japan and the 
United States 
Philippines with tl•e I are being grGdually ab::wrbed in 
the enlarging region~l and international contacts of these 
natio~ s. I am hopeful that they will soon be joined by the 
Republic of South Korea which remains an area of concern. I 
am hopeful, too, that steps will be initiated by the Chinese on 
Taiwan and the Chinese on the Mainland, looking to the re-
unification of what is one China. The security of the Western 
Pacific must come to rest far more heavily in the future on 
mutual restraint, normal relations and interdependence among 
the nations of that region and less on the military power of 
the United States . 
In regard to Europe, an updated approach to the rela-
tionship would presuppose, it seems to me, a substantial shift 
away from dependency on NATO and the Warsaw Pac~ and a greater 
effort to reach agreements which will continue to expand and 
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to consolidate constructive ties hetween East and West Europe . 
In the talks between the two segments which are now taking 
place, it might be helpful if the Soviet Union and this nation 
were to s t ,nd to the side and let the lead pass to smaller 
EuropPan states on both sides . 
The efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States 
might well be concentrated , instead , on disarmament, reductions 
of their forces in Europe, and the control of nuclear weapons 
whichta~e been pursued for so many years. In this connection, 
some risks for peace are clearly indicated if we are to reduce 
the ever - present and catastrophic risk of the collapse of human 
civilization that is inherent in international nuclear anarchy . 
To be sure, the nuclear test ban treaty, the SALT agreement, 
and other peripheral undertakings represent significant advances 
but they provide far from sufficient protection against the 
threat of nuclear destruction which from second to second hangs 
over all 0f us . 
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As for the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, it is, 
in my judgment, unrealistic for those who already possess 
nuclear weapons to ask other great states capable of producing 
them to refrain from doing so indefinitely unless--and I stress 
the word unless--such possessing states are themselves prepared 
to show the way in reducing and ending the nuclear threat. It 
is not enough for them merely to put ceilings on their already 
excessive nuclear arsenals. The need is to move in new ways 
on this question. In the current talks, it seems to me that 
the nuclear powers might well consider adding to the Treaty on 
non-proliferation a fixed time span, perhaps ten years, within 
which they would pledge mutual reductions of stockpiles and 
progress towards banning--in the manner of poison gas-- or in the 
control of usage of nuclear weapons by means of generally 
acceptable international mechanisms. Whether the United Nations 
can be reconstituted to play a significant role in this process, 
I do not know, but some international authority, it seems to 
me, must be involved. In any event, unless some tangible 
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progress of this kind is made, it is not likely that states 
capable of producing nuclear weapons are going to remain for 
long outside the inner circle of nuclear powe~ in international 
relations . 
If I may sum up, then, the need for the era ahead, as 
I SP-e it, will he to get away from the excesses of an indis -
criminate and, in many respects, increasingly disillusioning 
and isolated internationalism which has characterized our 
policies for the past two or three decades . \ole !IIl"t try to 
recast our relations with others to the end that they are 
multilateral and mutual in substance as well as in name . 
Insofar as the United States is concerned, this 
transition and development of policy must derive from Presi-
dential leadership but it must not derive from Executive fiat . 
If it is to find firm roots in our nation, any formulation of 
U. S. policy must depend on ~ concerted pffort in which the 
President is joined hy the Senate and the Congress, with P.ach 
re~pP.ctful nf the Constitutional sensibilities of the other . 
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It will depend on the many private universities and other 
sources of enlightenment in the nation. It will depend on a 
government which can be trusted by an informed people because 
it is credible in what it says and does and because it is alert 
and responsive to their needs and to the needs of the nation. 
You who graduate, today, and your counterparts through-
out the nation, loom large in what may be anticipated during 
the decades ahead. With the vote, you are in a position to 
make your weight felt in· the conduct of the government. You 
have such wisdom and training as education can provide. Those 
are highly important assets for your coming role in joining in 
shaping the nation's future. Beyond it, however, there is the 
part which the younger generation will have played in ending 
the tragedy of the involvement in Indochina. I, for one, of 
an older generation will applaud and thank you if you help to 
see to it that tragedies of that kind are not repeated. To 
move beyond Viet Nam into a future of world understanding and 
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peace will devolve heavily on you . To open a new era of 
constructive cooperation with the rest of the human race, to 
act with compassion and with high purpose for the welfare of 
the people of this nation ~d the world, that is your oppor-
tuni ty, you who are the ''new hands" of tomorrow . It is your 
life which lies ahead . It is your nation . It is your world . 
May you make the most of them all . 
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